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RESPONSE 
TO DAVID NIMMER 
Martha Woodmansee* 
The Qimron1 decision that is the subject of David Nimmer's 
essay2 derives much of its force from its deployment of a rhetoric 
of entitlement that I have termed the rhetoric of "Romantic 
authorship" in recognition of its source in early nineteenth-
century European cultural history.3 In its deliberations, the 
Israeli Supreme Court determined that Qimron put an 
extraordinary amount of work into deciphering and 
reconstructing the ancient text in question.4 Then it set about 
determining whether the work involved amounted only to "sweat 
of the brow" or rose to genuinely creative "authorial" work. The 
court writes: 
Examination of the work, on all of its levels as a complete 
single work shows originality and creativity that are 
undoubtable. Qimron's work was not, therefore, technical 
work, "mechanical," like simple manual labor the results of 
which are known in advance. His "inspiration," the "added 
soul" that he gave to the Scroll fragments, that transfigured 
* Professor of English, Case Western Reserve University. The "author" 
acknowledges with gratitude the decade-long collaboration with Peter Jaszi that has 
nourished these comments. 
1. C.A. 2790/93, 2811/93, Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. 817. 
2. David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 
38 Hous. L. REV. 1, 101 (2001). 
3. See generally Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic 
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 
425, 425-48 (1984) [hereinafter Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright]; MARTHA 
WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF 
AESTHETICS 36 (1994) [hereinafter WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET]; 
Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction to THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: 
TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1, 2-3 (Peter Jaszi & Martha 
Woodmansee eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP]. 
4. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. at para. 14. 
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the fragments into a living text, were not only confined to 
the investment of human resources, like "sweat," in the 
sense of "The sweat of man's brows." These were the fruits 
of a process in which Qimron used his knowledge, expertise 
and imagination, exercised judgment and chose between 
different alternatives.5 
One of the unexpected pleasures of being in literary studies 
has involved participating in the dismantling of this opposition 
between "sweat of the brow" and truly creative "authorial" work. 
The conclusion that my discipline has reached over the past 
thirty years is that the distinction is specious-that it is 
arbitrary and frequently a source of serious harm. Empirical 
research into the nature of composition, and creative production 
generally, has shown that we are always already cutting and 
pasting;6 and historical research has shown that the inclination 
to represent some creative productions as somehow more truly 
creative is rather recent. Not until the end of the eighteenth 
century do we find poets, publishers, and parliamentarians 
insisting on the originality of (some) creative work. The impetus 
for this Romantic (mis)representation of creative activity was the 
expansion-the first big expansion-in the market for printed 
books. In an effort to achieve visibility in a growing sea of printed 
matter, creative producers began to insist on the originality of 
their work: "My work is innovative; yours is merely hackwork."7 
The arbitrary distinction between "sweat of the brow" and 
truly creative "authorial" work is the basis for the court's decision 
in Qimron, and the court empowers its decision rhetorically by 
invoking some of the more archaic tropes of this Romantic 
model-for example, when it notes in the passage quoted above 
that Qimron's reconstruction of the ancient text exhibited the 
requisite "originality and creativity" to lift it out of the sphere of 
"sweat of the brow" into that of genuine authorship because, by 
the "force of his work" in reconstructing and deciphering the 
5. ld. 
6. See, e.g., ANDREA LUNSFORD & LISA EDE, SINGULAR TEXTS/PLURAL AUTHORS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON COLLABORATIVE WRITING (1990). 
7. See Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, supra note 3; WOODMANSEE, 
THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET, supra note 3, at 50-51; Martha Woodmansee, On 
the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra 
note 3, at 15-28; Martha Woodmansee, The Cultural Work of Copyright: Legislating 
Authorship in Britain, 1837-1842, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 65, 65-96 (Austin 
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of"Authorship," 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 471, 475; Peter Jaszi, On the Author 
Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AUTHORSHIP, supra note 3, at 29, 29-56; see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: 
THE INvENTION OF COPYRIGHT 2, 6 (1993). 
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fragments, Qimron "inspired," or "imbued" them with "soul," and 
thereby "transfigured the fragments into a living text."8 In this 
turn of phrase the court is casting Qimron's effort as one of 
giving new life and casting the creation of life not in terms of 
gestation in a woman's womb, but in masculine terms of 
insemination. 9 
The archaic-indeed, deeply patriarchal-roots of this way of 
representing the creative activities of Qimron surface even more 
vividly when the court turns from his economic rights to his 
moral rights. In the introduction to their purloined edition of the 
ancient text at issue, it will be recalled that Shanks and the 
other editors did not credit Qimron for the reconstruction they 
reproduced.10 In the eyes of the court this is tantamount to a 
denial of Qimron's paternity. Figuring the deciphered text as his 
offspring, the court writes: 
A man is entitled to have his name applied to the 
"children of his spirit." His spiritual connection to these is 
like, almost, his connection to those who come forth from 
his loins. Publication of a work without its being attributed 
to the name of its author "in the accepted manner and to 
the accepted extent" is a violation of the author's moral 
. ht 11 ng . 
Such rhetoric produces-it empowers-the wrong decision, for it 
locks up, as the property of a single scholar, a text of 
extraordinary historical and religious significance that should be 
made widely available. In this I agree with Nimmer, but I cannot 
agree with the means by which he proposes to achieve a better 
outcome. 
Nimmer believes that a better outcome will be achieved in 
Qimron if we simply attend to the plaintiffs intentions: Qimron 
intended to reconstruct with the greatest possible accuracy the 
meaning of an ancient author, not himself to author-to express 
his own subjectivity. In proposing his "rule of intentionality," 
however, Nimmer's aim is more ambitious than just to secure a 
different, better outcome in Qimron. He seeks thereby to 
articulate an autonomous, neutral principle-copyright 
principles generally-that will be independent of, and thus not 
8. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. at para. 14. 
9. On the gendering of creative production, see generally Richard G. Swartz, 
Patrimony and the Figuration of Authorship in the Eighteenth-Century Literary Property 
Debates, in 7 WORKS AND DAYS 29-54 (1989); CHRISTINE BATTERSBY, GENDER AND 
GENIUS: TOWARDS A FEMINIST AESTHETICS (1989). 
10. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. at para. 20 ("Appellants published the Deciphered Text in its 
entirety, without noting Qimron's name .... "). 
11. Id. at para. 23. 
234 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [38:231 
vulnerable to, criticism from outside the law, and in particular 
from literary criticism. 
In the rule of intentionality Nimmer believes that he has 
found such a principle. I disagree. My aim in these brief 
comments is to reassert the relevance of literary criticism in 
contemporary copyright discourse. The enormous number of 
literary scholars Nimmer quotes in his running assault on 
literary theory makes it easy to lose sight of what has been the 
central insight of literary theory as it has been applied to 
copyright over the last decade, and that is that the vision of 
authorship at the center of this body of law operates to obscure 
the complexity of creative activity-to impede arbitrarily and 
mischievously our ability to understand whose contributions to a 
given cultural production can and should be recognized in 
disputes. I believe that this holds equally true of Nimmer's 
principle of -intentionality. It does not succeed in escaping the 
force field of Romantic authorship. It may produce a more 
reasonable result in Qimron, but when we apply it in other 
contexts I believe we will see that it is not a neutral principle 
after all, but really just a strategic redeployment of the 
authorship test, and, accordingly, produces pretty much the same 
results as the vision of creative production that we have 
inherited from the nineteenth century. If I am right, I feel I will 
have defended the continuing relevance of literary studies in the 
discourse of copyright. 
Take the recent case of Aalmuhammed v. Lee12 in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adjudicated a claim to 
joint authorship in the making of the movie, Malcolm X. 13 
Nimmer's intentionality rule is actually applied in this case, with 
the consequence that the exclusive copyright of Warner Brothers 
is affirmed14 at the expense of a plaintiff whose contribution to 
the making of the film is agreed by all parties to have been 
"extensive. "15 
It seems that the plaintiff, Aalmuhammed, reviewed the 
shooting script, suggesting revisions-many of which were shot 
and some of which were included in the film ultimately 
released-and that he wrote entire scenes enacted in the film. 16 
An expert on Islam and the life of Malcolm X, Aalmuhammed 
had himself "previously written, directed, and produced a 
12. 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 
13. Id. at 1229. 
14. Id. at 1236. 
15. Id. at 1229, 1231. 
16. Id. at 1229-30. 
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documentary film about Malcolm X."17 In addition to clearly 
copyrightable contributions, Aalmuhammed made other 
"substantial and valuable contributions to the movie,"18 according 
to the court, including "direct[ing] Denzel Washington and other 
actors while on the set, ... translat[ing] Arabic into English for 
subtitles, supply[ing] his own voice for voice-overs, select[ing] the 
proper prayers and religious practices for the characters, and 
edit[ing] parts ofthe movie during post production."19 
Substantial as this (partial) list of contributions may seem, 
it did not add up to co-authorship in the eyes of the court: 
Aalmuhammed did not at any time have superintendence of 
the work. Warner Brothers and Spike Lee controlled it. 
Aalmuhammed was not the person "who . . . actually 
formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and 
arranging the place .... " Spike Lee was, so far as we can 
tell from the record. Aalmuhammed. . . could make 
extremely helpful recommendations, but Spike Lee was not 
bound to accept any of them, and the work would not 
benefit in the slightest unless Spike Lee chose to accept 
them. Aalmuhammed lacked control over the work, and 
absence of control is strong evidence of the absence of 
coauthorship.20 
Moreover-and apparently decisive-we are told that Warner 
Brothers could not "logically" have "intended to share ownership 
with individuals like Aalmuhammed" when it even required 
director Spike Lee to sign a "'work for hire"' agreement. 21 
We may or may not agree with the court's decision in 
Aalmuhammed. My point is not that Aalmuhammed deserved a 
larger share of recognition and profit than he received, although 
it seems that a case could be made for it. The point is rather that 
meaningful deliberation about whose contributions can: and 
ought to be recognized has been foreclosed upon prematurely by 
the court's application of the intentionality test. The only way the 
intentionality principle can deal with Aalmuhammed is to erase 
him. This the principle shares with our standard authorship 
tests. 
In other situations, application of the intentionality principle 
goes farther-producing clearly undesirable results. Consider the 
case of the Aboriginal artist whose design is reproduced without 
17. Id. at 1229. 
18. Id. at 1231. 
19. Id. at 1230. 
20. Id. at 1235 (footnotes omitted). 
21. Id. 
236 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [38:231 
authorization by a carpet or T-shirt manufacturer.22 Fortunately, 
as I believe Nimmer would agree, cases like this are more and 
more frequently being decided in favor of the Aboriginal artists. 
But it is not clear that this would be the outcome if Australian 
courts applied the intentionality rule he is proposing. Could we 
say that the artists who created these designs intended to 
function as authors-to imbue the designs with their own 
subjectivity? Consciously? Even unconsciously? It is unlikely that 
they would describe their activity in this way, or, indeed, even 
accept such a description of it. That is because, like Qimron, they 
view the activity in which they are involved as one rather of 
transmission-transmission of the meanings of their forebears. 
Application of the intentionality rule would thus deny copyright 
to these creative producers-in the same way as have our 
standard authorship tests.23 
David Nimmer's proposal would not, then, seem to advance 
the cause of more reasonable decisions. It seems, rather, to 
produce pretty much the same predictable winners and losers as 
does the traditional authorship test-which it extends the reach 
of. Like this test, it mystifies-it simplifies complex creative 
processes, obscuring understanding of whose contributions can 
and should be recognized. 
22. See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles PTY Ltd. 157 A.L.R. 193, 195, 211-12 (1998) 
(fincling that the copyright owner of an artistic work has a fiduciary obligation to enforce 
the copyright); Milpurrurru v. lndofurn (1994) 30 I.P.R. 209 (holding that the carpet 
manufacturer infringed the copyrights of the Aboriginal artists by reproducing their 
artwork without license). 
23. See generally Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, The Ethical Reaches of 
Authorship, 95 S. ATLANTIC Q. 947 (1996). 
